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I . ETCHODÜCTICN AND SUMMARY 
At this marnent in time there is em awareness that the persistent economic 
crisis affecting Latin America and Caribbean countries has had a high social 
cost shewn by the severe deterioration in the standard of living of broad 
social sectors and, particularly, an increase in unsatisfied basic needs in 
poorer social strata (G.A. Cornia, 1987; FKEAIC, 1988b? ECLAC, 1987). This 
report is an effort to bring together and update sane of the fragmentary and 
dispersed data existing in the region on this subject. It also attempts a 
general analysis of the dynamics of this deterioration. It is not, therefore, 
an "assessment" of the social situation —not everything has deteriorated 
since in many countries there have also been improvements in sone areas— but 
a warning and a step towards defining those areas and negative social 
tendencies which should draw the attention of government planners and action 
in coming years.*/ 
On the whole, it suggests that there seems to have been a rupture in 
the social and economic development style which predominated in the region 
before 1982 (ECLAC, 1989). In the majority of the countries, there can 
already be seen what could be a new way of functioning of the economy which 
exacerbates some distorsions of the previous model —such as productive 
heterogeneity— and to which new distorsions are added —such as the already 
chronic shortage of capital, a virtual stagnation in the creation of highly 
productive jobs and a reduction in per capita public social spending. The 
social cost of the economic crisis has been greater or less and more or less 
equitably distributed in each country according to a complex causality which 
combines the seriousness of the ecoronic retrogression, the policies applied 
to meet it, the growth rate of the population, the present stage of 
development of each country, the degree of democratic participation, and the 
strength of ooranunity and trade-union organizations. In almost all the 
countries, however, the new dynamics mentioned present a strong challenge to 
social policy in the 1990s; there is a real danger that the slew social 
progress achieved before could stagnate and the vicious circle of social 
problems which feeds itself could broaden. Particularly worrying is the 
increase in the number of young adults without sufficient access to education 
and productive enployment, who are excluded from productive modernization, 
both in the countries of the region where the most rapid phase of development 
has been recent, now the majority, and in the less developed countries which 
have not yet taken off. 
*J The implications of these negative social trends must be taken into 
account in the formulation of crime prevention policies. This theme will be 
analysed in a document prepared for this meeting by the United Nations latin 
American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders. 
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H . MAIN REPERCUSSIONS CN SOCIAL EEVED0ÏMENT 
OF THE ECCNCKCC CRISIS 
It is not the purpose of this paper to repeat the analysis of the "debt 
crisis" or of the eacncmic growth problems presently confronting the region 
(ECLAC, 1988a). It is absolutely necessary, however, to stress scare changes 
in economic trends which are central to the dynamics of the social 
deterioration analysed below. 
Hie first of these economic changes is the negative flow of capital 
(see figure l) which appeared for the first time in the region in 1982 as a 
result of the increase in foreign debt service, the pronounced drop in new 
loans and investments, and unfavourable market conditions for many of the 
region's exports, the result has been a net transfer of resources from the 
region to developed countries which, far from being conjunctural and limited 
to 1982, has been similar or greater in each following year (see figure 1). 
The persistence of this net transfer of resources and the difficulties for 
saving and investing this inposes, contribute to a notorious and equally 
persistent drop in historical rates of product growth (see figure 2) and, 
given demographic growth, in the value of the per capita gross domestic 
product in almost all the countries of the region. In fact, only Colombia and 
Cuba showed significant per capita GDP growth between 1982 and 1988. 
Starting in 1984, the GDP has grown significantly in Chile (see figure 3 and 
table 1 of annex 1), while in the other countries, in Argentina, Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and (in 1988) Panama, this key indicator 
stagnated or fell more than 10% and up to 39% in the last seven years. 
Inevitably, these retrogressions in economic growth and investment capacity 
have had negative effects on employment, income, and spending on social 
services and human resource training. 
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Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL 
AND NET TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 
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Source:  ECLAC, Preliminary  Overview  of  the  Latin  American  Economy  (LC/G. 1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, p.38. 
Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
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Source: ECLAC. on the bask of  official  figures  provided by the countries. 
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figures. 
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HI. EMPLOYMENT AND INCEME IN THE CRISIS 
1. Ĉ en unemployment 
One of the most immediate and dramatic social effects of the foreign debt 
crisis was the strong increase in open unemployment in several of the 
countries of the region such, as Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (see table 2 of annex 1). 
However, except in five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras 
and Panama), open unemployment in Latin America had shewn a general tendency 
in recent years to stabilize at historical levels (see figure 4). On the 
other hand, the social cost to labewr of the economic crisis seems 
increasingly more apparent in other aspects, which already threaten to become 
chronic problems: the stagnation of employment in the modern sector, the lew 
participation of wages in the national product, and the absorption of the 
work force in "residual" sectors of low income employment —that is, in less 
productive jobs within the informed urban sector and, to a lesser degree, in 
agriculture (see tables 1 and 2). 
2. Recent chancre in employment structure 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the sustained economic growth of the majority of 
Latin American and Caribbean countries was accompanied by a growing 
absorption into the modern sector of increasingly better qualified and more 
productive human resources, while unqualified labour in agriculture was 
rapidly diminishing as a proportion of the economically active population. 
This "structural occupational mobility" (ECLAC, 1989), although insufficient 
to reduce the relative size of the informal urban sector or the absolute 
number of poor persons, brought with it a growing number of relatively well-
paid jobs in the formal sector, especially salaried posts in large and 
medium-sized private enterprises and in the jublic sector. But during 
1980-1987 this positive dynamic was reversed in many countries and became 
negative. 
m the first place, the creation of new posts in large private 
enterprises (on average, the most productive and better paid) has been 
practically stagnant for seven years in five of the seven countries where 
I3REALC has been able to provide detailed data (see table 3). Stagnation in 
absolute numbers can be seen in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Mexico. Only Chile (where there has also been a transfer of large State 
enterprises to the private sector and high unemployment) and Venezuela showed 
growth rates in employment in large private enterprises, barely equivalent 
to the growth rates of the total economically active population (see tables 
3 to 9 of annex 1). 
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Figure 4 
LATÍN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
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Source:  ECLAC, Preliminary  Overview  of  the  Latin  American  Economy  (LC, G. I536J, Santiago, Chile, 1988. p. 28. 
T a b l e 
LATIN AMERICA: EKEAKDOWN OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE FOPUIATION, 
1980, 1983 AND 1987 &/ 

















1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1983 110.9 108.8 151.7 105.1 124.1 113.6 93.1 130.1 
1987 124.8 125.2 116.1 112.7 156.1 132.4 103.1 155.1 
Source; FREAIC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987. Work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 
1988. 
a/ Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWIH RATE OF THE POPULATION 
EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT 
1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1987 
1. Population employed 
in agriculture 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.7 1/ 
2. Agricultural product 3.7 3.5 3.7 2.4 
Fuente: ECLAC. on the basis of official information? 
ã/ PREALC, preliminary estimates on the basis of official information from 
seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico 
and Venezuela). 
Cuadro 3 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF ABSOUJIE GROWIH OF THE ECONOMICALLY 













Argentina 111 118 103 
Chile 120 109 123 
Brazil 129 170 102 
Costa Rica 124 127 107 
Colombia 123 148 105 
Mexico 125 182 99 
Venezuela 125 118 122 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by PREALC from official 
sources and household surveys. 
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Meanwhile, the economically active population has shown steadily 
increased, although at highly vailed rates according to the current 
demographic transition stages of the various countries in 1980-1987. 
There have been two more general consequences of both phenomena. Ihe 
first is a notable reversal fran the historical decrease in the proportion of 
the population working in agriculture (see table 2), to an accumulated growth 
of almost 13% in seven years. Ihe second consequence has been a staggering 
growth of the informal urban sector in many countries of the region. In 
Colombia this was 48% greater in 1987 than in 1980; in Brazil its grcwth was 
70% and in Mexico 82%, according to PREALC data. 
As a result, the informal urban sector (including self-employed non-
professional workers or workers in non-agricultural private enterprises with 
fewer than 10 salaried employees) is estimated to be the segment which most 
increased its relative weight in the non-agricultural economic active 
population between 1980 and 1987 in all of the countries for which there is 
information (see tables 3 to 9 of annex 1). This situation is in contrast 
with the previous historical trend in the three decades previous to the 
crisis when the informal urban sector remained a constant proportion of the 
non-agricultural economically active population (Garcia and Tokman, 1985). 
Ihe inversion of the relative weight of formal and informal segments in 
non-agricultural employment and the growing difference separating them can 
also be seen in figure 1 of annex 2. As shewn in the last tables mentioned, 
the remaining sector of the economically active population —the public 
sector— shows different trends according to the intensity of privatization 
policy in each country, but in no case recovers the role of massive 
generation of qualified employment which the public sector played in 
previous years. 
3. Impacts on income 
As a first approximation for understanding the impact of the crisis on 
income, the data collected by ECLAC (ECLAC, 1988a) indicate that both the 
minimum wage and average wages have developed very distinctly in the 
different countries and, in sane cases, by 1988 would appear to have 
recovered their real value of eight years ago (see tables 10 and 11 of annex 
1). However, same caution is necessary in interpreting these data. On the one 
hand, the minimum wage is a legal norm which may or may not correspond to 
wages actually paid. Also, because of the very hi#i inflation rates in sane 
countries (see table 12 of annex 1) salary and wage adjustments have been 
insufficient to maintain their real value, with few exceptions. On the other 
hand, the "average wage" mentioned refers almost exclusively to the 
industrial sector which both has the greatest trade-union negotiating 
capacity and least absorbs labour these years. 
Data from household surveys provide a view more consistent with the 
trends observei in the economies of the region and in their labour markets. 
Actually, between 1980 and 1987, the industrial wage is the only wage which 
shows a slightly more favourable evolution than the per capita gross national 
income (see figure 2 of annex 2). Particularly notable is the drop in wages 
in construction, gateway to the modern sector for less qualified labourers. 
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A net effect is that total income from labour has grown less than total 
gross national income since 1983 (see figure 3 of annex 2). Another is that, 
in seven countries representing more than 80% of the regional population, 
taken as a whole, the average income from labour dropped strongly in all 
segments of the economically active population (see table 4). It increased 
only in Colombia (where there was growth in total product) and in Costa Rica 
(apparently due to trade-union participation in agreeing to a more equitable 
strategy for meeting the crisis). 
As stated in the ïïŒALC study, "... the way the region adjusted to the 
external problem of this decade was to compress wage levels more than was 
necessary to exactly compensate the drop in per capita national income ... It 
seems reasonable to think that these effects were not entirely inevitable 
..." (HŒAIC, 1988a, pp. 25 arri 32). 
4. Income in the informal urban sector 
Recent studies (KLein, 1988, ECLAC, 1988b) have emphasized the heterogeneous 
character of the quality of the self-enployed manual jobs and the jobs in 
small enterprises. A significant subsegment of this statistical set, 
commonly used as a proxy/variable for the informed urban sector, shows a 
capacity to provide productive employment. However, probably the great growth 
of jobs in the informal sector has concentrated in "low income and 
productivity1' jobs, jobs created by those who do them, disguised 
unemployment, or in small enterprises whose owners have taken advantage of 
the drop in the cost of labour by adopting relationships which more 
intensively use labour, frequently outside labour protection laws and social 
security. In fact, the average income in the informal sector dropped by more 
than 40% in seven years (see table 4). 
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Table 
a/ INCOe FROM WORK BY GROWTH 3 
( Indexes 1980-100 and growth rates) 
Front agr icu l tura l 
employment 
Fran pr iva te formal 
sector employment, 
large enterprises 
From pr ivate formal 
sector employment, 
small enterpr ises 
Frem publ ic employment 
Fran informal employnsnt 




1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 rate 1960-1967 
100 100.5 
EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE LABOUR INCOME 
93.6 88.8 87.1 78.5 93.8 77.2 -3.6 
100 96.4 99.8 90.4 90.1 93.4 95.5 85.1 -2.3 
100 98.8 96.5 87.0 82.1 84.1 82.1 69.1 -5 .1 
100 92.7 90.2 80.7 76.4 79.3 76.0 68.0 - 5.4 
tOO 88.1 80.6 71.5 68.0 67.1 68.1 58.9 - 7.3 







$ource: PREALC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987. work docunent 328, Santiago, Ch i le , 1988, 
p. 37. 
a/ Includes Argentina, B r a z i l , Ch i le , Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela. 
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IV. QCWEraOŒNT SOCIAL SENDING: EQUITY AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
CKEATTCN 
State pending on health, education, nutrition, housing, social security, 
etc., serves two general functions in overall social policy. In the short 
term, it redistributes income from taxes, contributions, and loans paid by 
society as a whole in the form of benefits or "social consumption" which 
supplement monetary inoane and ccnpensate its inequitable distribution. In 
the medium term, it raises the quality of the human resources of a country 
both by progressively improving the productivity of the labour force and by 
providing more personal capital, in the farm of knowledge, to social sectors 
previously left behind. 
Ihis last aspect will be treated in section VI on possible future 
dynamics of social change. The first aspect, on the other hand, belongs to 
the evaluation of the income and consumption situation of the poorer social 
strata. 
On the one hand, the trends vary considerably from one country to 
another with respect to relative social spending considered as a proportion 
of gross domestic product or toted government spending (see tables 13 and 17 
of annex 1). However, about half of the cases have shown a deterioration in 
one or both of these indicators for one or more social services, a trend 
which was not very frequently sustained before the crisis. If we take into 
account that both product and government spending have fallen in almost all 
cases while total population continues increasing, probably per capita social 
spending in real values has fallen absolutely in the majority of the 
countries. Evidently, this aggravates even more the panorama of the drop in 
monetary and non-monetary income of the majority, in its standard of living 
and in its ability to satisfy basic needs. The long-term repercussions are 
equally evident and especially negative for the evolution of human resources 
and in relation to the dynamic of social deterioration. In education, 
particularly, the prolonging of restrictive government policies which were 
supposed to be short term has already had an influence in the emission of 
some absolutely necessary investments. "It is different to claim that over a 
period of one or two years new investments cannot be made" in the educational 
sector, from following "a non-investment policy in educational services or 
other social sectors over a long period" (lagos, 1988, p. 57). In some 
countries an increase in the number of pupils per teacher has already been 
noted (see table 18 of annex 1) as wall as a tendency suggesting a growing 
dichotomization of the social structure: an increase in attendance at private 
educational institutions of children from families which can pay (see table 
19 of annex 1). 
These data are still too fragmentary to permit speaking with certainty 
of a clear trend. Indications in some countries of a deterioration in social 
services is a concern, however, although others seem to have been sore 
successful in public response to present social needs. 
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V. RECENT TREND OF SCME WELFARE INDICATCRS 
lhe secular improvement of the main aggregate welfare indicators such as the 
rate of infant mortality or the mortality rate far children ureter five years 
of age is not immediately affected by fluctuations in the economic growth 
rate (see figure 4 of annex 2). These indicators are associated with other 
variables such as the dissemination of existing medical technology, the 
provision of State services, the increase in educational levels, the 
extension of carrmmications, water and sewage infrastructure, etc., which 
have diffuse positive effects in improving gradually, but persistently, the 
basic conditions of mortality, sickness, and life expectancy and their 
delayed effects have a strong positive inertia. 
However, with pronounced and very prolonged decreases in monetary and 
social income, even the semi-autoncmcus improvement processes inevitably lose 
momentum compared with the speed of progress before the crisis. This is 
logically predictable, particularly among the higher risk groups and social 
sectors which are the most affected by the reduction in productive 
employment, the drop in real wages, and the reduction in public social 
services with respect to growing needs. In fact, there has been no delay in 
the appearance of sane indications of a drop in the rate of improvement of 
infant mortality rates (see figures 5 and 6 of annex 2) which are alarming 
even though they refer to specific populations. This is true above all when 
the deterioration happens in countries there these rates are still relatively 
high and it could have been expected that they would continue to decline even 
in situations of eccnanic stagnation. 
There is also fragmentary, but eloquent, evidence relative to the most 
direct causes of the lack of improvement in infant mortality rates. Not only 
have the indicators of maternal-child care begun to fall again, but also in 
sane countries and metropolitan areas, the indicators of child malnutrition, 
of underweight pregnancies, and underwelcfrit births have worsened or stagnated 
(Patino et al., 1988; Macedo, 1987), all of which have obvious causal 
relationships with the danger of child death and are also a logical result of 
the deterioration of real income in low-income groups. 
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VI. THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL OETEERICRKnCN: THE CHALLENŒ 
FOR  SOCIAL PLANNING 
1. A wicked example 
It is undoubtedly evident that the economic, political and social processes 
summarized here are closely interrelated. Siaply put, the net loss of capital 
(among other factors) brakes economic growth and the creation of productive 
jobs? this leads to an oversupply of labour which, combined with austerity 
adjustment policies and measures to increase earnings from exports leads 
(especially with inflation) to a reduction in the real income of the poorer 
levels which is exacerbated by the reduction of governmental r edistributive 
spending on social services. The fined effect is of a persistent braking of 
the progress achieved by the basic social welfare indicators in the period 
before the crisis. The fact that the social cost has not only not been 
equitably distributed but, in many countries, has, to the contrary, fallen 
disproportionately on the less influenciai majority, carries the serious risk 
of an increase in social conflicts, a situation which has already actually 
been seen in more than one country. 
2. Economic prospects for the nineties 
What are the prospects of aggravating or alleviating this negative dynamic? 
On the one hand, at the moment there is cautious optimism concerning the 
possibility of diminishing the net capital transfer from the region to the 
industrialized countries in a few more years (see figure 1) by changing the 
financial negotiation of the debt to an international political negotiation. 
Also, there are proposals and experiences of new growth impulses and new 
stimuli for economic ccnpetitivity, at least in the countries of the region 
with greater productive potential. However, there is still no forecast of a 
return of the strong positive flows of capital which helped to feed product 
growth in the sixties and seventies. To the extent that the recovery of 
ccnpetitivity rests exclusively cn the sectors of greater productivity the 
present inequity could be maintained or increased even with ecsoncmic growth. 
It is known that before the crisis the concentration of income in many 
countries of the region was already very hic£i with respect to other regions. 
The key difference fro* the present situation is that, before, growth allowed 
an absolute increase in the income of the lower levels while the expansion of 
jobs in the modern sector and the educational boom supported an expectation 
of rising social mobility for the poor (ECLAC, 1989). 
These positive circumstances, which gave a degree of legitimacy to the 
style of development and made inequity more tolerable, are absent from both 
the present situation and medium-term possibilities. 
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3. Hiimn resources and social mobility: changes in the 
educational and occupational situation of 
young adults 
One of the relatively more precise methods for detecting the direction of 
medium-term changes in the socio-occupaticnal structure is to examine the 
changes and recent situation of young adults (between 15 and 24 years of 
age). More than a sinple evaluation of the present problems of youth or a 
projection of the human resources available to the economy, the purpose of 
the exercise rests on the possibility of analysing these human resources as 
holders of valuable personal capital, whose hopes far incorporation and 
mobility in productive employment over their future adult working cycles will 
be determined by a given range of employment opportunities. 
thus, in the sixties and seventies, the tendency for sdtool attendance 
at secondary and higher levels to increase contributed directly to raising 
the average productivity of the work force, which found a dynamic demand for 
qualified labour, especially in modern non-manual services. This improvement 
of the educational level of successive new generations constituted one of the 
most important social advances of the decades prior to the crisis. Presently, 
one of the most worrying aspects of the drop in household income is the 
danger that youth from families which cannot continue to pay the cost (and 
the opportunity cost) of their studies will prematurely leave school. Data 
for recent years on school attendance rates, although they do not allow a 
detailed analysis, suggest important differences in the level and trend of 
the proportion of children and youth studying in different countries. In 
some, there are indications that, in recent years, the historical trend 
towards better educational coverage could be slowing down (see tables 20 to 
24 of annex 1). 
In the medium and long term, the probable consequence of today's 
adolescents prematurely leaving school is the creation of a growing mass of 
low-qualified workers coopeting far an always relatively decreasing number of 
productive manual jobs. Youths without secondary education are virtually 
condemned (since the great majority will not be able to return to school) to 
an adult life without socio-occupational mobility, since it has been shown 
that such a low level of qualification usually limits work prospects to 
alternatives such as cleaner, loader, street-seller, domestic servant, etc. 
(Martinez, 1985). 
Before the crisis the following secular trend was typical of the 
socio-productive modernization process in almost all the countries of the 
region: increases, both among men and women, of the percentage of youth and 
young adults pursuing formal studies. However, preliminary data taken from 
household surveys suggests that, Bince the crisis, the percentage of young 
men studying has dropped at the secondary school level (15-19 age group) in 
some countries of the region. 
Premature school-learning seems to coincide with a greater tendency for 
youth to seek paid work. Between 1970 and 1980, in the countries in process 
of social modernization, labour participation of young men tendend to 
decrease as their education was prolonged while young women, abandoning 
exclusive dedication to the heme, increased both their educational attendance 
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and their participation in the labour force (ECLAC, 1989). In the period 
after the crisis, in contrast, labour participation of young men seems to 
have increased again in some countries as compared with the overall tendency 
of the adult population which does not seem to have changed (PKEAIC, 1988, 
pp. 45-47). 
At the same time as more youth seek work, they are the last to be hired 
and the first to be fired. In fact, the unenployment rate of the 15 to 19 
age group in the crisis period doubled, tripled and reached up to six times 
the unemployment rate of active persons of about 40 years of age (see table 
25 of annex 1). The doubt arising ncw is whether these youths (who in 1995 
will be between 24 and 33) will manage to lorer their unenployment rates in 
the future to the same levels as their seniors now or whether the development 
style emerging in the region is generating a growing population of 
unemplcyables. A different social problem is presented by the growing nunber 
of youth with hi^ier education who cannot find suitable employment because of 
the above-mentioned stagnation in the formal sector. Although in the long 
term their prospects are less serious than those of the "unenployables" with 
little education, in the short and medium term the unemployed youths with 
higher education harbour strong frustration of their expectations based on 
the traditional role of secondary and higher education as a vehicle for 
rising social mobility. 
4. The challenge and the independent variable 
Although the fragmentary information available on education and employment is 
still inadequate for definitive conclusions, the mere fact that in many 
countries long-term progress seems to be slowing down, constitutes a 
relative worsening considering, above all, the strong present and future 
growth in the number of youths (see table 26 of annex 1). In various 
countries of the region, a challenge can be seen for the medium term in the 
farm of the rapid growth of a subsector of adult society, uneducated and 
difficult to employ in the technified economy of the nineties. One should be 
aware of the possible social dynamics which could create in the region 
countries increasingly more dichotomized, inequitable, and where open social 
conflict is becoming a daily emergency. 
lhe independent (or semi-independent) variable is public policy both in 
the remediate sense (such as alleviating the shortages and problems created 
by the style) and strategic (such as breaking the vicious circle of poverty 
reproduction through a multisectoral attack), and in the wider sense, such as 
creating development styles which increase equity, through a national project 
which brings together all the instruments of economic planning with the 
social instruments and which manages to mobilize the civic support of the 
majority. 
Both the problems and the solutions they require are very distinct from 
one kind of country to another. At a more abstract level, social dynamics in 
a country where the educational level of youths is relatively high, but the 
creation of new productive jobs is slow for structural reasons (premature 
exhaustion of the rapid phase of productive modernization), is different from 
that of a country where the number of youths grows appreciably from year to 
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year, with a high percentage under-educated, but where the potential for 
productive modernization 1s greater, given its low initial level. Both need 
to find new sources of dynamism in the creation of productive employment and 
in the training of human resources to the level of technological change. 
However, particularly in the second case, a strategy satisfying the criteria 
of real development —that is, the aonditicns far increasing equity and 
progressively eliminating poverty and exclusion— will be more radically 
different frcxn past styles, from the style imposed by the crisis, ard frcm 
the orthodox fcamillas for imitative growth. To achieve this general purpose, 
and to design the three types of social planning enumerated above, it is 
absolutely necessary to carry out metre empirical research on the various 
facets of the possible dynamics of social deterioration which this paper has 
tried to point oat. 
In conclusion, an analysis of the preliminary data suggests that the 
present economic crisis has social repercussions which go beyond the 
immediate present deterioration observed in the welfare level of large 
sectors of the population of the countries of latin America and the 
Caribbean. Prospects for the 1990s of predictable rates of economic growth, 
the creation of new productive jobs, and government resources suggest that a 
new social dynamic may arise lacking various processes of social progress 
which characterized the periods of rapid development, the sixties and 
seventies. Although the seriousness of the dynamics of deterioration or 
social stagnation will be more or less accentuated according to the 
particular characteristics of each country, an increase in social problems 
(especially those affecting the new generation of young adults who cannot 
realize their aspirations for occxqpaticnal mobility through education and the 
rapid creation of new jobs in the modern sector) will be a challenge which 
social policy, in its overall forro.il aticn and in its various subsectors, will 
probably have to meet in the 1990s. 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF 
PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Annual growth rates Cumulative 
variation 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988" 1981-1988" 
Latin America 
(excluding Cuba) -3.5 -4.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 0.3 -1.5 -6,6 
Oil-exporting 
countries -3.1 -7.5 0.1 -0.1 -3.3 -0.9 -1.4 -12.5 
Bolivia -6.9 -9.0 -3.0 -2.8 -5.6 -0.3 -0.3 -26.3 
Ecuador -1.8 -4.0 1.8 1.9 0.5 -11.2 5.0 •7.6 
Mexico •3.0 -6.5 1.2 0.2 -6.1 -0.8 -1.7 -10.6 
Peru -2.3 -14.1 2.1 -0.3 6.2 3.8 -9.8 -13.6 
Trinidad and Tobago -1.2 -15.0 -6.4 -3.3 •5.3 -8.1 -5.5 -38.6 
Venezuela -4.0 -8.1 -4.2 -1.4 4.0 0.3 2.3 -146 
Non-oil-ex porting 
cauntries -3.7 -2.9 2.2 2.3 4.6 1.0 -1.5 -2.9 
Argentina -7.2 1.1 0.8 -5.8 4.4 0.3 -0.8 -15.2 
Barbados •5.2 0.0 3.2 0.6 4.8 1.4 2.1 4.3 
Brazil -1.4 -4.6 3.4 6.0 5.8 0.7 -2.3 1.5 
Colombia -1.1 •0.3 1.6 1.6 3.7 3.3 1.9 11.1 
Costa Rica -10.0 -0.3 4.8 •2.1 2.4 1,7 0.4 -8.7 
Cubafc 3.3 4-3 6.5 3.9 0.3 -4.7 1.0 33.1 
Chile -14.5 • 2.2 4.3 0.7 3.6 3.7 4.5 1.9 
El Salvador -6.5 •0.3 1.3 0.5 -1.2 0.8 -0.8 -15.2 
Guatemala -6.1 -5.4 -2.8 -3.3 -2.6 0.2 0.6 -19.5 
Guyana -12.6 -11.7 0.3 -0.8 -1.6 -1.1 
Haiti -5.2 -1.2 -1.4 •1.3 -1.3 -2.4 -6.8 -21.7 
Honduras -5.4 -3.6 -1.2 -1.9 -0.9 0.9 -0.2 -14.1 
Jamaica -¡.5 -0.4 -2.2 -6.9 1.0 4.1 1.4 -2.8 
Nicaragua -4.0 1.2 -4.8 -7.3 -3.9 -1.7 -12.1 -27.4 
Panama 2.7 -2.2 -2.6 26 1.3 0.0 -26.6 -24.0 
Paraguay -4.0 •6.0 0.0 0.9 -3.3 1.4 3.1 -3.0 
Dominican Republic- -1.1 2.5 -2.0 -4.1 0.8 5.5 -1.3 1.4 
Uruguay -10.7 •6.6 -2.0 -0.6 6.3 4.5 -0.8 -9.8 
Source: ECLAC, Preliminary  overview of  the Latin American economy, ( LC/'G. 1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 18. 
Preliminary figures,  subject to revision. Refers  to total social product 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
i A lerage  annual rates) 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Argentina" 2.6 4.7 5.3 4.7 4.6 6.1 5.2 5.9 6.5 
Bolivia'' 7.1 5.9 8.2 8.5 6.9 5.8 7.0 5.2 11.7 
Brazil* 6.2 7.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6 3.7 4.0 
G>lombia 9.7 8.3 9.1 11.7 13.4 14.0 138 11.7 ¡ 1.4 
Costa Rica' 6.0 9.1 9.9 8.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 5.6 5.2 
Chile' 11.7 9,0 20.0 190 18.5 17.0 13.! ! 1.9 11.2 
Ecuador' 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.7 10.5 10.4 12.0 12.0 13.0 
Guatemala* 2.2 1.5 6.0 9.9 9.1 12.0 14.2 12.6 12.0 
Honduras* 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.5 10.7 11.7 12.1 13.0 13.1 
Jamaica' 13.8 11.2 14.3 13.1 12.1 10.9 10.9 8.6 8.7 
Mexico7 4.5 4.2 4.2 6.6 5.7 4.4 4.3 3.9 3 6 
Panama* 10.4 10.7 10.1 11.7 12.4 15.6 12.6 14.1 20.8 
Paraguay' 3.9 2.2 5.6 8.3 7.3 5.1 6.1 5.6 
Peru" 7.1 6.8 6.6 9.0 8.9 10.1 5.4 4.8 
Uruguay" 7.4 6.7 11.9 15.5 L4.0 13.1 10.7 9.3 9.2 
Venezuela" 6.6 6.8 7.8 11.2 14.3 14.3 12.1 9.9 8.3 
Source: ECLAC, Preliminary  overview of  the Latin American economy, (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 18. 
"National urban rate, average for  April-October. 1986: October, 1988: May. "Whole country, official  estimates. The figures  are 
not strictly comparable over time because the geographical coverage of  the surveys has been expanding of  year by 
year ' Metropolitan Areas of  Rio de Janeiro, Sïb Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife,  average for 
12 months; 1980, average June-December; 1988, average January-September. J Bogotá, Barranquitla, Medcllin and Cali, 
average for  March, June, September and December; 1985: average for  March, July and December; 1986: average for  April, 
June, September and December; 1988: average for  March, June and September. 'National urban. Average for  March, 
July and November; 1984, average March and November; 1986: average March and July; 1987: July. As from  the latter data, 
the figures  ate not strictly comparable with the preceding ones as they correspond to the new Multi-Purpose Household 
Survey, in which there have been changes in the methodology. 'Greater Santiago. Average for  four  quarters. As from 
August 198} data relate to the Metropolitan Region of  Santiago. Since October 198Í the figures  are not strictly comparable 
with the preceding ones due to changes in the design and size of  the sample. 'Whole country. Official 
estimates. *Whole country, official  estimates.! 1986: Urban Labour Force Survey; 1987: March, Central 
Distria. 'National average, April and October, 'Metropolitan areas of  Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, 
average for  four  quarters; 1988: average January-September 'National urban, August of  each year. From 1978 refer  to 
Metropolitan Region. 1980: data from  population census of  chat year. 'Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and 
urban areas of  Luque and San Lorenzo, annual averages; 1981: first  half  of  year, 1983: average for  September, October and 
November; 1984: average for  August, September and October; 1985: average for  November and 
December. " Metropolitan Lima; 1985: official  estimates. "Montevideo, average of  four  quarters. 1988: average of 
two quarters. "Country-wide urban rate, average for  the two half-years;  1984 and 1985, country-wide rate; 1986: second 
half  of  year; 1988: first  half  of  year. 
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Table 3 
ARGENTINA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION 
EAP 




1980 100 97.5 2.5 
1983 100 96.0 4.0 
1987 100 94.6 5.4 
Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 4 
ARGENTINA: EMPLOYED EOFUIAÏTCN, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL 
Years Population 
employed 
Situation of enployed population 
Agricultural Non-agricultural 
1980 100 12.5 87.5 
1983 100 12.5 87.5 
1987 100 12.4 87.6 
Source: FKEAIC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 5 




Years employed urban 
population sector 
1980 100 26.3 
1983 100 27.1 
1987 100 28.8 
Formal sector 
Private 
Public Large small 
enterprises enterprises 
18.9 41.8 13.0 
18.4 41.5 13.0 
18.8 39.9 12.5 
Source: PKEALC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 6 
BRAZIL: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POFULATICN 
EAP 




1980 100 95.7 4.3 
1983 100 95.1 4.9 
1987 100 97.2 2.8 
Source: FREAIC, on the basis of official Information. 
Table 7 
BRAZIL: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NCN-AOUCUIÍIURAL 
Years Population 
Employed 
Situation of enployed population 
Agricultural Non-agricultural 
1980 100 28.8 71.2 
1983 100 27.1 72.9 
1987 100 25.4 74.6 
Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 8 




agriculturally Informal Private 
Years enplcyed urban Public Large Small 
population sector enterprises enterprises 
1980 100 24.0 10.8 52.0 13.2 
1983 100 29.6 10.9 40.5 19.1 
1987 100 29.7 11.0 38.6 20.8 
Source: HREAIC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 
O C A : BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED O A T I N 





1980 100 91.0 9.0 
1983 100 88.0 12.0 
1987 100 89.0 11.0 
Source: HŒALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 10 
COLOMBIA: EMPLOYED PORJIATTCW, ACStfCUITURAL AND NQN-AGRICULOTPAL 
Years Population 
Employed 











Source: EÏŒALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 11 























13.8 35.9 18.3 
13.1 31.0 21.4 
12.1 29.5 21.2 
Source: FHEALC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 12 
COSTA RICA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED FORJLATION 
EAP 











Source: FREAIC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 13 
COSTA RICA: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NCN-AGRICUIÍIURAL 
Years Population 
Employed 











Source: PREAIC, en the basis of official information. 
Table 14 























26.7 29.7 15.1 
27.6 25.5 17.7 
27.2 25.4 18.3 
Source: HŒALC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 
IL: BREAKDOWN OF HE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POATICN 
EAP 




1980 100 83.9 16.1 
1983 100 74.7 27.9 
1987 100 90.0 10.0 
Source: FEEALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 16 
CHILE: EMPLOYED POHJIATICN, AGRICULTURAL AND NOÍ-ACRICUIÍTURAL 
Years Population 
Enplcyed 
Situation of employed population 
Agricultural Non-agricultural 
1980 100 19.7 80.3 
1983 100 23.7 76.3 
1987 100 23.5 76.5 
Source: FKEALC, , on the basis of official information. 
Table 17 

































Source: EAC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 1 
IC: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED O A T I N 





1980 100 95.5 4.5 
1983 100 93.3 6.7 
1987 100 96.0 4.0 
Source: FKEAIC, en the basis of official information. 
Table 19 
MEXICO: EMPLOYED POHJIATICM, AGRICULTURAL AND NCN-AGRICUIHURAL 
Years population 
employed 











Source: HSEALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 20 






















21.8 29.1 24.9 
24.7 26.5 23.6 
25.5 21.6 19.8 
Source: HŒALC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 2 
A: BREAKDOWN OF HE EAP 1980-1987, 
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED OJATIN 





1980 100 94.3 5.7 
1983 100 89.8 10.2 
1987 100 90.2 9.8 
Source: EKEALC, en the basis of official information. 
Table 22 
VENEZUELA: EMPLOYED POEUIATICN, AGRICULTURAL AND NCN-AGRICULIURAL 
Years Population 
employed 











Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information. 
Table 23 






























Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION 
OF URBAN REAL MINIMUM WAGES 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988° 
Annual average indexes * 1980 = 100) 
Argentina" 100.0 97.8 97.8 136.9 167.7 117.1 111.1 122.3 95.8 
Brazil 100.0 104 4 104.9 9 3 0 86.0 88.8 87.1 71.2 67.1 
Colombia'' 100.0 98.9 103.6 107.9 113.5 109.4 114.2 113.0 111.3 
Costa Rica' 100.0 90.4 85.9 9 9 3 104.4 112.2 118.7 118.6 116.5 
Chii</ 100.0 115 7 117.2 94.2 80.7 76.4 73.6 69.1 73.4 
Ecuador* 100.0 86.2 75.9 63.6 62.8 60.4 65.0 61.4 53.6 
Mexico 100.0 101.9 92.7 76.6 72.3 71.1 64.9 60.6 53.6 
Paraguay' 100.0 103.9 101.9 94.2 93.8 9 9 6 108.3 122.6 134.2 
Peru' 100.0 84.2 77.8 89.2 6 9 0 60.3 62.5 64.0 60.1 
Uruguay* 100.0 103.4 104.6 89.6 89.9 94.1 88.3 91.1 85.6 
Venezuela' 100.0 86.2 78.5 73.9 66.5 96.8 92.3 95.3 76.2 
Percentage variation™ 
Argentina 17.3 -2.2 0.0 40.0 22.5 -30.2 -5.1 10.1 -21.8 
Brazil 2.6 4.4 0.5 -11.3 -7.5 3.3 -1.9 -18.3 -7.4 
Colombia 2.5 -1.1 4.8 4.1 5.2 -3.6 4.4 -0.1 -3.0 
Costa Rica 1.4 -9.6 -5.1 15.7 5.2 7.4 5.8 0.0 -2.5 
Chile 0.3 15.6 1.3 -19.6 -14.4 -5.3 -3.6 -6.1 6.1 
Ecuador 65.5 -13.8 -11.9 -16.2 -1.3 -3.8 7.6 -5.5 -12.6 
Mexico •6.7 1.9 -9.0 -17.4 -5.6 -1.7 -8.8 -6.6 -11.6 
Paraguay 8.2 3 9 -1.9 -7.5 -0.5 6.2 8.7 13.2 9.5 
Peru 23.8 -15.8 -7.6 14.7 -22.7 -12.6 3.6 2.5 -3.1 
Uruguay -4.6 3.4 1.2 -14.3 0.3 4.7 -6.2 3.2 -6.0 
Venezuela 62.8 -14.1 -8.9 -5.9 -10.0 45.5 -4.7 3.4 -22.2 
Source: ECLAC, Preliminary  overview of  the latin American economy, (LC/G.I536), Sanriago, Chile, 1988, page 20. 
"Preliminary figures.  "National minimum wage. 1988, average January-October. 'Minimum wage for  the city of 
Rio de Janeiro, deflated  by the corresponding CPI. 1988: average January-October. ''Minimum wage for  upper urban 
sectors, 1988: average January-October. 'National minimum wage. 1988: First half  of  year. 'Minimum income. 
¡988: average January-October. 'General minimum official  living wage. 1988: average January-
Ociober. Minimum wage in Mexico City, deflated  by the corresponding CPI. 1988: January-October. 'Minimum 
Wage in Asuncion and PuercoStroessner. 1988: average January-November. 'Minimum wage in Metropolitan Lima for 
non-agricultural activities. 1988: January-October. 'National minimum wage for  persons over 18 years of  age. 1988: 
average January-September. 'National minimum wage for  non-agricultural activities. 1988: average January 
October. "Compared with the same period in the previous year. 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION 
OF REAL AVERAGE WAGES 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988" 
Annual average indexes i 1980 = 100) 
Argentina^ 100.0 89.4 80.1 100.5 127.1 107.8 109.5 103.0 97.9 
Brazil 
Rio de Janeiro' 100.0 108.5 121.6 112.7 105.1 112.7 121.8 1 0 2 4 99.8 
São Paulo'' 100.0 104.7 107.2 94.0 97.9 120.4 2 50.7 143.2 147.5 
Colombia' 100.0 101.4 104.8 110.3 118.5 114.9 120.2 119.7 1 1 9 0 
Costa Rica* l o o o 88.3 70.8 78.5 84.7 92.2 97.8 
Chile* 1 0 0 0 108.9 108.6 97.1 97.2 93.5 95.1 94.7 1 0 0 9 
Mexico 100.0 103.5 104.4 80.7 75.4 76.6 72.3 72.8 
Peru' 100.0 98.3 100.5 83.7 70.1 59.6 75.5 80.0 52.7 
Urugua/ 100.0 107.5 107.1 84.9 77.1 88.1 94.0 98 5 100.8 
Percentage variation 
Argentina 11.8 -10.6 -10.4 25.4 26.4 -15.2 1.6 -5.9 -5.0 
Brazil 
Rio de Janeiro 5.2 8.5 12.1 -7.3 -6.7 7.2 8.1 -16.0 -12.8 
SSo Paulo 8.0 4.7 2.4 -12.3 4.1 23.0 25.2 -5.0 4.6 
Colombia 0.8 1.4 3.7 5.0 7.3 -3.0 4.9 -0.4 -0.6 
Costa Rica 0.8 -11.7 -19.8 10.9 7.8 8.9 6.1 
Chile 9,0 8.9 -0.2 -10.7 0.1 •3.8 1.7 -0.3 6.7 
Mexico -2.9 3.5 0.9 -22.7 -6.6 1.6 -5.6 0.7 
Peru 12.4 -1.7 2.3 -16.7 -15.5 - 1 5 0 26.7 6.0 -34.5 
Uruguay -0.4 7.5 -0.3 -20.7 -9.2 14.1 6.7 4.8 2.3 
Source; ECl.AC, Preliminary  nveri'ieu  <:f  the Latin American economy.(\.C/Q.  ¡556), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 19-
"Preliminary figures.  "Average total monthly wages in manufacturing.  Average for  twelve months. 1988, average 
January-September. ' ' Average wages in basic industry, deflated  by the CPl for  Rio de Janeiro. Average for  twelve 
months. 1988, average January-May. "Average wages in manufacturing  in the State ofSïo  Paulo, deflated  by the cost-
of-living  index for  the city of  Sâo Paulo. Average for  twelve months. 1988, average January-September. 'Wages of 
Manual workers in manufacturing  (except coffee  processing). Average for  twelve months. 1988, average January-
July. 'Average wages declared for  social security members. "Average remuneration of  wage-earners in non-
agticultural sectors. Average for  twelve months. 1988, average January-October. '"Average wages in manufacturing 
Average for  twelve months. 'Wages of  private-sector workers in Metropolitan Lima Average for  February, May, 
August and November. 1987, average for  twelve months. 1988, January-October. yindexof  average real wages. Average 
for  twelve months. 1988, average January-September "Compared with the same period in the previous year. 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 
'  Variations  from  December to December/ 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988" 
Latin America 56.0 57.5 84.6 130.8 184,8 274.7 64.5 198.9 472.8 
Argentina 87.6 131.2 209.7 433.7 688.0 385.4 81.9 174.8 372.0* 
Barbados 16.1 12.3 6.9 5.5 5.1 2.4 -0.5 6.3 4.3 1 
Bolivia 23.9 25.2 296.5 328.5 2 177.2 8 170.5 66.0 10.7 20.9* 
Brazil 95.3 91.2 97.9 179.2 203.3 228.0 58.4 365.9 816.1* 
Colombia J 26.5 27.5 24.1 16.5 18.3 22.3 21.0 24.0 27.7* 
Costa Rica 17.8 65.1 81.7 10.7 17.3 11.1 15.4 16.4 23.2' 
Chile 31.2 9.5 20.7 23.6 23.0 26.4 17.4 21.5 10.9* 
Ecuador 14.5 17.9 24.3 52.5 25.1 24.4 27.3 32.5 80.5'' 
El Salvador 18.6 11.6 13.8 15.5 9 8 30.8 30.3 19.6 i8.o* 
Guatemala 9.1 8.7 -2.0 15.4 5.2 3 1 5 25.7 10.1 13.4' 
Guyana 8.5 29.0 19.3 9.6 
Haiti 15.6 16.4 4.9 11.2 5.4 17.4 -11.4 -4.1 8.3 s 
Honduras 11.5 9.2 8.8 7.2 3-7 4.2 3.2 2.7 6.6' 
Jamaica 28.6 4.8 7.0 16.7 31.2 23.9 10.4 8.4 7.7s 
Mexico 29.8 28.7 98.8 80.8 59.2 63.7 105.7 159.2 70.5* 
Nicaragua 24.8 23.2 22.2 32.9 50.2 334.3 747.4 1 347.4 7 778.4* 
Panama 14.4 4.8 3.7 2.0 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.2* 
Paraguay 8.9 15.0 4.2 14.1 29.8 23.1 24.1 32.0 16.8* 
Peru 59.7 72.7 72.9 125.1 111.5 158.3 62.9 114.5 1 307.1* 
Dominican Republic 4.6 7.3 7.2 7.7 38.1 28.4 6.5 25.0 57.3' 
Trinidad and Tobago 16.6 11.6 1 0 8 15.4 14.1 6.6 9.9 8.3 6.0s 
Uruguay 42.8 29.4 20.5 51.5 66.1 83.0 76.4 57.3 68.5* 
Venezuela 19.6 11.0 7.3 7.0 18.3 5.7 12.3 40.3 31.2* 
Source: ECLAC, Preliminary  overview of  the latin American economy, (LC/G.Î5J6), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 19. 
"Figures corresponding to the variation in prices over the last twelve month period ending in the month given for  each 
country. ^Corresponds to variations between November 1987 and November 1988. 'Corresponds to variation 
between August 1987 and August 1988, Up to 1980, corresponds to variation in theConsumer Price Index for  manual 
! workers; from  1981 onwards, corresponds to the variation in the nation-wide index for  both manual and non-manual 
; workers. 'Corresponds to the variation between October 1987 and October 1988 'Up to 1982, corresponds to the 
variation in the. Consumer Price index for  the city of  Quito; from  1983 onwards, corresponds to the variation in the nation-
wide index. 'Corresponds to variation between September 1987 and September 1988. *Up to 1982, corresponds to 
the variationiin ¡he Consumer Price Index for  the city of  Santo Domingo; from  1983 onwards, corresponds to variation in the 
i nation-wide index. 
Table 27 
SOCIAL SERVICES: EDUCATION. SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING 
OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BV COUNTRIES, 1970-1987 
(  Percent ages) 
'If 
Country 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1985 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Argentina 11.1 6.7 12 4 13.3 12.5 13.5 6.9 9.9 10.1 11.3 12.2 10.6 9.4 9.1 13.4 8.5 8.5 9.1 
Bahamas . . . ... 21.8 19.1 19.7 21.0 22.4 20.9 21.8 
Barbados 20.4 21.8 22.8 23.4 20.6 228 22.4 197 20.6 22.1 21.1 21.4 19.1 20.5 2 ¡ .0 20 8 19.0 18.4 
Bolivia 52.} 28.6 20.5 22.7 29.1 23.2 25.6 25.2 29.3 32.1 27.3 26.3 13.5 315 12.9 19.8 
Brazil 1 1 5 106 11.1 11.8 12.0 6.1 5.2 4.0 3 9 4.2 2.7 2.9 3.4 2.5 2.2 
Colombia 16.9 19.3 20-3 20 3 21.0 22.5 16.8 24.8 26.3 22-7 24.5 2V5 25.0 24.4 
Cosia Rica 26.8 31.8 30.4 30.7 32.6 35.3 33 5 34.5 33.3 32.4 29.6 27.3 24.1 22.7 21.7 22.5 22.8 
Chile 9.5 9.8 12.0 9.4 8.0 9.5 10.2 13.5 12.8 12.9 13.1 10.9 9.9 9.5 9.7 9 K 
Ecuador . . . 36.6 33.9 38 7 37.1 37.5 33 7 32.9 34.0 51.4 24.5 25.9 
EI Salvador 236 27.6 25.0 25.3 25.9 22.6 23.2 21.1 197 19.3 18.3 ¡7.8 18.0 14.4 15.9 16.2 
Guatemala 166 18.7 17.2 15.5 12.4 1 19 12.5 12.1 12.7 112 12.* 12.6 12.9 12.9 13.3 
Guyana 1 }.9 8.7 142 15.7 15.5 10.0 8.2 14.4 14.6 135 11.5 11.2 9.2 a. 3 7.1 9,9 5.6 7.9 
Haiti 6.9 6.0 5.5 6.6 5.5 4.2 3.4 3-4 3.4 4.9 6.7 5.7 4.7 4 6 1.4 4.5 
Honduras 20.5 20.9 22 6 23.9 20.6 163 17.5 15.1 13 9 14.8 13.4 16.9 15.8 16.0 14.9 19.1 19 9 19.2 
Jamaica 14.1 15.6 13.8 16.1 15 2 16.5 15.4 15.8 14.4 15.6 17.4 16.0 16.6 17.5 16.2 15.6 
Mexico 16.9 15.2 14.3 14.8 163 18.6 21.1 20.9 20.0 17.3 16.7 12 7 10.1 10 4 10.6 
Nicaragua 192 17.5 17.6 15 9 140 14.0 16.2 16.2 11.3 12 8 10.6 118 10.2 8.6 10,6 12.0 11.7 
Panama 20.6 20.1 19.0 18 6 20.0 168 16.2 17.1 18.8 16.0 17.6 17.4 17.3 19 3 18.2 21.3 
Paraguay 13.9 14.0 140 16.3 14 9 15.2 13.3 15.3 16.4 111 3.9 4.3 7.2 7.B 11.9 12.2 14 4 139 
Peru 21.4 21 0 21.5 22.9 21.7 19.4 18.5 15.6 14.3 15.5 15.6 17.4 16.4 15.2 16.0 16.1 
Dominican 
10.0 Republic ... 14.4 137 14.5 12.1 101 11.6 11.5 12 1 12.5 11.9 15.3 15.0 13.3 14.0 11.5 
Suriname ... 12.4 12-9 13.1 16.3 14.4 15.4 1.5 0.8 1.1 0.7 10 
Trinidad 
and Tobago ... 14.5 9.6 7.9 8.8 7.5 8.7 85 8.0 6.8 9.6 10.5 11.6 12 6 15.5 ¡5.4 
Uruguay 158 17.2 18 0 15 9 15.9 16.8 11.7 13.4 12.1 11.0 9.7 84 7.4 8.4 
Venezuela 16.2 165 18.1 18.6 9.6 11.8 14.1 14.0 16.3 20.3 17.5 16.9 16.2 196 17 0 18.6 17.7 
Source: Inter-A mentón Development Bank (IDB), Report utt économie and  maul progrès*  in lutin America. IVHH.  Washington, DC, 19«8. 
Tabic 28 
SOCIAL SERVICES: EDUCATION. SECTORAL PUBLIC SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987 
(Percentages) 
Gmntry 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Argentina 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.8 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.7 ) 6 1.5 1.7 
Bahamas ... 3.7 4.1 42 4.4 3.9 3.8 3.9 
Barbados 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.7 5.8 6.2 7.0 6.5 6.3 6.6 6 5 7.0 5.9 5.7 6 3 6.4 5.8 5 9 
Bolivia i l 3.4 3.1 3 0 3.1 2.7 33 3.2 3.7 .3.9 3.8 3.4 2.8 2.9 4.1 2.1 
Bruil 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.8 (1.6 12 1.6 
Colombia 1.7 2.0 1 9 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 2.1 2.4 2 3 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 
Costa Rica 3.4 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.5 6.0 5.5 6 0 6.2 6.2 5.0 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.1 4,3 
Chile 3.9 4,9 6.0 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.1 35 1 8 3.3 3-4 3.3 
Ecuador 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.7 2.8 3.1 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.9 5.3 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.7 4.1 
El Salvador 2.9 3.6 3.2 31 3.3 3.3 3 3 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.4 3.8 3 6 3.0 3.0 2.8 
Guatemala 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1 8 1.8 1.6 1.4 14 1.2 ¡ 4 
Guyana 4.4 4 5 4.8 6.6 5.5 5.4 5.8 7.0 6.3 7.0 7.2 8.5 7.0 7.0 6 6 7.4 5.9 5.9 
Haiti 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 12 l.l 1.0 1.0 
Honduras 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.(1 3.5 3.7 .3 8 3 9 4.7 4 7 1.5 
Jamaica 3.2 3.8 3.7 4 1 5.3 5.9 6.6 6.2 6.0 6.1 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.3 ^ 7 5.3 
Mexico 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 .3.2 3.2 3.1 3.6 3.4 2 6 2 5 2.6 
Nicaragua 2.3 2.4 2.5 2-3 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.5 3.5 4.2 4.2 5.5 6.3 6.6 5.H 
Panama 4.2 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.1 3.9 3.8 3 9 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.4 1.6 4.9 4.7 4.7 
Paraguay 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.5 ! 4 1.5 1.6 1 3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.3 1..? l.l 10 
Peru 3.2 .3.3 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.6 2.5 3.0 3.2 2.B 1 H 2.K 2 6 
Dominican 
Republic ... 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.2 1 9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1 1 
Suriname 4.0 4.4 4.8 5.8 5.7 7.1 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Trinidad 
and Tobago . . . 2.7 2 5 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 4.1 4.3 4.7 4.9 5 S 5.Í1 
Uruguay . . . 2.5 2.7 3 1 2.6 2.6 2 7 1.8 1.9 2.0 1-9 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.5 
Venezuela 3.1 3.2 3.7 37 3-4 4.0 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.2 4.3 5.1 4.6 5.0 4.3 4 9 4.5 
Source: Inrer-Amcrican Development Bank <IDB>, Report on economic and  tocia/  progrès  t in Lut m America 1 VtiH.  Washington, DC... 1988 
Table 29 
SOCIAL SERVICES: HEALTH. SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING 
OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987 
(Percentages  ) 
Country 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1980 1987 
Argentina 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.8 2.7 3.2 3.9 5.3 3.7 3.4 3.3 2.5 2.1 2.1 33 2.4 3.2 3.i 
Bahamas ... ... ... ... 14.3 12.1 12.7 13.1 15.5 15.1 16.6 
Barbados 16.7 15.8 16.4 16.4 15.3 15.8 14.2 13.2 14.6 16.4 16.3 15.0 13.3 ! 4.0 14 A 13.2 13.1 13.0 
Bolivia 9.1 9.7 6.8 8.8 11.1 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.7 9.1 12.4 7.8 1.9 38 1.6 3-1 
Brazil 12.5 10.9 106 10.4 11.3 5.8 6.6 5.5 5.8 5.7 5.2 5.5 5.8 4.8 53 3.3 2.0 
Colombia 7.9 6.4 8.0 8.4 7.6 7.8 6.9 8.9 9.5 7.6 7.9 6.4 6.7 5.7 
Costa Rica 3.1 8.1 6.2 9.5 7.2 6.7 6,2 5.5 6.7 5.7 7.9 5.9 6.2 5.0 6.3 2.6 2.4 
Chile 4.3 6.0 6.8 5.9 4.7 5.5 5.2 6.4 6.3 5.8 6.6 9 0 9 2 8.8 8.6 8.2 
Ecuadsr ... ... 11.4 11.1 16.0 15.6 12.8 13.2 139 15.0 14.7 7,3 7.2 
El Salvador 10.5 10.9 10.1 10.6 10.6 10.6 9.4 9.2 8.4 8.6 8.3 7.7 7.2 6.6 7.5 6 8 
Guatemala 8.1 8.7 8.3 8.3 6.3 7.1 8.5 8.7 11.2 7.1 10.8 6.3 7.1 7.4 9.4 
Guyana 6.7 3.7 6.2 6.7 5.8 4.6 3.6 5.9 7.4 6.5 6.6 5.9 6.5 4.8 4.0 5.5 3.7 5.8 
Haiti 7.9 6.7 6.2 6.6 10.0 7.7 6.2 4.3 4.3 6.9 5.5 4.5 5.1 4.3 4.3 4.2 
Honduras 9.1 9 1 8.9 10.6 10.3 7.3 10.1 8.0 6.4 6.7 6.0 7.3 6.7 6.7 5.7 8 ! 11.0 9 2 
Jamaica 8.7 9.4 8.8 9.2 8.0 7.6 7.2 7.5 6.1 7.7 9.0 8.1 8.8 8.4 8 3 8.5 
Mexico 3.1 3.3 30 2.8 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.1 2.4 2.2 1.1 0.6 I.I 1.1 
Nicaragua 5.9 7.1 4.2 5.1 6.0 8.1 6.9 5.3 4.3 10.7 134 12.7 10.6 7.5 7.3 9.1 13.3 
Panama 9.3 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.9 8.4 7.5 7.3 6.6 5.4 6.1 (7.0 6.0 6.9 6 9 8.0 
Paraguay 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 3.0 4.3 7.2 7.8 8 . 4 7.8 5.8 5 3 
Peru 6.3 5.7 5 9 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.9 4.6 5.5 6.0 5.6 6 0 5.2 5,4 5.8 6.0 
Dominican Republic ... 10.6 10.3 10,1 10.0 8.8 11.1 10.9 11.5 11.4 11 5 14.5 9.5 8.5 9.6 7.6 6 9 
Suriname 8.9 8.8 9.2 8.9 7.7 8.4 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 9.2 5,4 5.0 5.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 4.1 4.2 5,4 6.0 6.7 7.0 8.4 8.9 
Uruguay 3.3 6.9 8.5 5.5 5.8 5.6 7.2 6.2 6.7 5.4 4.1 5.4 4.3 5.3 
Venezuela 7.6 7.1 7.3 7.2 33 4.1 5.2 4.8 5.1 5.8 4.7 5.0 5.1 5.2 4.7 4.8 5.2 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Ri-port on économie and  social progress  tn Latin America. 1988, Washington, DC, 1988. 
Tab 
SOCIAL SERVICES: HEALTH. SECTORAL PUBLIC SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987 
(Percentages) 
Country 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Argentina 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Bahamas ... ... ... ... 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 
By rbados 5.0 4.7 4.9 5.4 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.1 1.2 
Bolivia 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.0 0.4 0 4 0.5 0.4 
Brazil 1.3 1.2 i.l 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 
Colombia 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0 6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Costa Rica 0.4 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.0 12 0.5 0.4 
Chile 1.7 3.0 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.9 3.6 30 3.0 2.7 
Ecuador 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.6 1 8 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 11 l.l 
El Salvador 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 1,4 1.4 1.4 1,2 
Guatemala 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 
Guyana 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.8 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 4.1 4.4 4.9 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.0 4.4 
Haiti 1.1 Î.0 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 0 9 
Honduras 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 1,5 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.6 2.2 
Jamaica 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.8 2 8 3.1 3.0 2.5 3.0 00
 
3.6 38 3.5 2.9 2.9 
Mexico 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Nicaragua 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.9 2.1 4.4 4.6 4.4 4,8 4.3 5.0 6.6 ... 
Panama 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1,6 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Paraguay 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 0 9 0.7 0.4 04 
Peru 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Dominican Republic 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Suriname 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.9 ... 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Trinidad and Tobago ... 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.2 
Uruguay ... 0.5 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 1,1 0.8 0.9 
Venezuela 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.4 15 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.4 1 4 1,2 13 I.Î 
Sourer: llltir- Ameritan Development Bank (IDBi, Report on economic and r«W pragrvu  1» Latin America. ¡VHK  Wellington, D.C , I'JHX 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT : SOCIAL SPENDING a/ , BY COUNTRY, 1980-1985 
(Percentaiae of GDP) 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Argentina 5.2 5.2 4.0 5.3 4.9 5.9 
Bahamas 7.1 7.7 7.9 8.2 7.8 7.7 
Barbados 16.3 16.6 14.3 13.8 14.9 15.6 
B o l i v i a 6.0 4.8 9.7 n.a. 5.7 4.1 
B raz i l 8.6 9.3 10.6 9.5 8.7 n.a. 
Colootoia 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.5 n.a. 
Costa Rica 9.8 7.9 7.3 8.7 7.8 a. 5 
Ch i le 16.8 20.0 25.3 20.8 20.4 19.4 
Ecuador 11.4 12.2 11.8 10.8 9.9 4.8 
El Salvador 6.2 6.2 5.8 5.5 5.9 5.1 
Guatemala 6.0 5.5 5.2 2.8 2.8 2.0 
Guyana 11.6 14.1 16.5 15.6 14.4 16.2 
Ha i t i 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.2 
Honduras 4.9 5.6 5.9 6.1 6.1 8.2 
Jamaica 14.0 15.5 14.4 13.8 10.4 9.5 
Mexi co 3.3 4.4 4.9 3.6 3.6 3.5 
Nicaragua 10.2 10.2 9.9 11.8 12.2 13.0 
Panama 8.1 8.0 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.2 
Paraguay 2.7 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.4 
Peru 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6 
Dominican 
Republic 5.4 5.5 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.7 
Suriname 1.9 3.9 4.3 1.7 n .a . n .a . 
Tr inidad and Tobago 8.8 9.2 12.2 13.1 13.7 14.0 
Uruguay 8.3 8.7 13.0 10.3 8.3 8.2 
Venezuela 8.3 9.4 10.0 9.8 9.4 9.8 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank <IDB), Report on economic and soc ia l progress in Lat in America. 1988. 
Washington, D.C., 1988. 
& Inc ludes education, h«alth, soc ia l secur i ty, housing and other soc ia l serv ices , 
n.a. Not a v a i l a b l e . 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: NUMBER OF RJFILS FER  TEACHER 
IN PRIMARY EEUCATICN 
1975 1982 1987 
Argentina 18 20 20 (86) 
Bolivia 22 25 (84) 29 
Brazil 22 25 24 
Colombia 32 30 30 
Costa Rica 29 33 32 (86) 
Cuba 23 16 13 
Chile 35 33 31 
Ecuador 38 36 32 
El Salvador 44 45 48 
Guatemala 35 35 35 
Haiti 41 43 40 (84) 
Harturas 35 37 38 (84) 
Mexico 45 37 32 
Nicaragua 40 36 32 
Panama 27 26 22 
Paraguay 29 26 25 (86) 
Peru 39 38 33 
Dominican Republic 51 46 34 
Uruguay 24 21 (83) 22 (86) 
Venezuela 30 26 26 
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook. 1986 and 1987. 




LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN REGISTERED 
IN PRIVATE PRIMARY SCHOOLS 
Country 1975 1980 1983 1984 1985 1987 
Argentina 17 • • • • • • 19 IS • • • 
Brazil 13 13 13 • • • 12.3 
Costa Rica 4 3 3 3 • « • 
Chile 18 20 27 29 35.3 
Ecuador 17 16 16 • • * 16.6 
El Salvador 6 7 8 • • • • • • 
Mexico 6 5 5 5 5.5 
Panama 5 6 7 7 7.9 
Peru 13 13 • • • • • • 14 12.1 
Dominican 
Republic 12 12 13 • • • • • « • • • 
Uruguay 17 16 15 • • • * • • • • • 
Venezuela 11 11 12 • • « • « « 11.7 
Source: Tedesoo, J.C. (1987). lagos, R. "Efectos del proceso de ajuste 
económico sobre la educación en América latina", UNESCO (1988). 
S/ 1987, provisional figures from UNESCO, Sistema de Información Regional 
Integrado (SIRI) (1988). 
Table 34 
LATIM AMERICA: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE RATE 
(Th i rd leve l , g ros s rates by sex) 
1975 19B1 1986 
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Ma Le Female 
Argentine 
B o l i v i a 
B raz i l 





E l Salvador 
Guatemala 
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0 . 8 (84) 









Source: UNESCO, S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook. 1986 and 1987. 
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Table 35 
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
(Third level, by sex) 
1975 1981 




Trinidad and Tobago 
10.0 n.a. n.a. 
3.8 5.0 2.7 
6.7 n.a. n.a. 
5.1 6.0 4.2 
18.7 n.a. n.a. 
2.8 3.1 2.5 
6.0 n.a. n.a. 
4.8 5.8 3.8 
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1986. 
Argentina (13-17) 
B o l i v i a (14-17) 
B r a z i l (15-17) 
Ch i l e (14-17) 
Colombia (12-17) 
Costa Rica (12-16) 
Cuba (12-18) 
Ecuador (12-17) 
E l Salvador (16-18) 
Guatemala (13-18) 












LATIN AMERICA: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
(Secondary education, by sex) 
1975 1981 1986 
Total Male Female Total Male Fetnale Total Male Female 
54 51 57 
31 n.a. n .a . 
26 24 28 
47 44 51 
39 39 39 
42 40 45 
48 44 52 
39 41 38 
19 21 17 
12 13 11 
8 8 7 
16 16 17 
34 41 28 
24 23 24 
55 52 57 
20 20 20 
46 50 41 
36 n.a. n.a. 
60 n.a. n.a. 
45 42 48 
60 (83) 57 (83) 62 (83) 
34 37 31 
34 n.a. n.a. 
56 51 60 
46 (82) 45 (82) 47 (82) 
47 43 50 
75 72 77 
53 53 53 
20 19 21 
17 18 16 
12 13 12 
32 (82) 30 (82) 34 (82) 
51 54 49 
39 (82) 36 (82) 42 (82) 
60 57 64 
28 n.a. n.a. 
61 65 57 
45 n.a. n . a . 
64 n.a. n.a. 
41 37 46 
74 68 79 
37 40 U 
n.a . n.a. n . a . 
n.a. n.a. n . a . 
56 55 56 
36 34 37 
86 84 89 
55 (84) n .a . n . a . 
24 (84) 23 (84) 26 (04) 
20 n.a. n.a. 
16 (84) 19 (84) 17 (84) 
33 (84) 31 (84) 36 (84) 
55 56 64 
42 27 57 
48 44 51 
30 30 29 
65 ( 85 ) 68 ( 85 ) 61 (85) 
47 n . a . n .a . 
71 (85) n . a . n .a . 
46 41 50 
Source; UNESCO, S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook. 1986. 
Table 3 
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
(Secondary education) 
1975 1981 1986 
Total Hate Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Barbados (11-16) 73 
Guyana (12-17) 54 
Jamaica 56 
Tr in idad and 


















93 (84) 93 (84) 94 (84) 
72 
n.a. n.a. 
58 (83) 56 (83) 60 (83) 
50 (85) 48 (85) 53 (85) 
•o 
Source: UNESCO, S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook. 1986 and 1987. 
Tab 8 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
(Primary school, by sex) 
1975 1980 1986 






Costa Rica (6-11) 
Clisa (6-11) 
Ecuador (6-11) 







































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY AGE 
Argentina 1980 1984 1987 
15-19 6.8 13.5 15.2 20-34 2.5 3.6 5.4 35-49 1.5 2.4 3.3 50-64 1.2 1.6 3.6 Costa Rica 1980 1983 1986 12-29 9.4 13.1 9.6 30-49 2.1 5.0 3.1 
50-69 2.4 4.1 3.1 
70 and over 1.8 1.9 1.5 Chile 1980 1982 1985 
15-24 20.4 30.5 24.3 
25-44 7.4 17.6 10.8 
45-54 6.2 13.3 7.2 
55 and over 3.8 6.7 2.6 Mexico 1980 1983 1987 ^ 
15-19 12.2 18.9 11.9 
20-24 6.4 10.8 8.2 
25-34 3.0 4.2 3.4 
35-44 1.4 3.1 1.7 
45-54 1.7 3.1 1.8 
55-64 1.7 2.4 2.4 
65 and over 1.7 2.1 1.4 
Peru £/ 1984 1986 
15-24 17.2 9.6 
25-34 7.7 5.1 
35-44 4.1 2.9 
45-54 5.1 2.1 
55 and over 4.2 2.6 
Urucfuay â/ 1987 
Uhder 25 23.8 
Over 25 5.7 
Venezuela 1980 1984 1987 
15-24 11.5 23.2 16.1 
25-44 3.9 11.3 6.7 
45-54 2.0 6.6 4.2 
55 and over 15.0 4.9 2.8 
Source: EEEALC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 v 1987, Work 
document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988. 
3/ October of each year; Greater Buenos Aires. 
Average of two quarters? Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INCREASE IN ADOLESCENT POPULATION 
(15-19 YEARS), 1985-1995 
Country Absolute increase Relative increase 
(in thousands) in 1995 (1985=100) 
Argentina 760 357 131 
Bolivia 226 986 134 
Brazil 2 269 365 116 
Colombia 202 053 106 
Costa Rica 42 471 115 
Cuba -392 466 65 
Chile -61 827 95 
Ecuador 230 687 122 
El Salvador 161 644 130 
Guatemala 325 882 139 
Honduras 160 365 110 
Haiti 83 315 113 
Mexico 906 091 110 
Nicaragua 132 263 136 
Panama 18 950 107 
Peru 450 428 121 
Paraguay 90 227 123 
Dominican Republic 49 943 107 
Uruguay 25 594 110 
Venezuela 394 252 121 
Source: CELAE5E, Demographic Bulletin. Year XX, No. 40, Santiago, Chile, July 
1987. 
ANNEX 2 - FIGURES 

Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE, 1980 ¡987 
IPercentages  of  non-agricultural  employment) 
— — Large private enterprises, formal  sector Urban enterprises, informal  sector and small enterprises, 
formal  sector. 
Source:  PREALC, La evolución del  mercado  laboral  entre 1980 y 1987. work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988. 
Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: PER CAPITA WAGES AND INCOME, 1980 1987 a 
(Indexes  1980 - 100) 
•Per capita « Industry . • Construction - - - - - Mining • Agriculture 
gross income 
Source: PREALC, La evolución del  mercado  laboral  entre 1980 y 1987, work document 328, Sándalo, ('¡lili-, I 'IKK. 
aSeven countries. 
Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA: WORK INCOME AND NATIONAL INCOME, 1980 1987a 
(Indexes  1980 -100) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 l«»K6 1987 
Total work income Cross national income 





The narrowing gap 
The gap between the industrialized world and the 
developing work is narrowing according to some 
social indicators such as the mortality r3te of 
children under five  years of  age (MRC5) 
240 
Drop in MRC5, industrialized and 
developing countries. 1960-1978 
The widening gap 
The gap between industrialized and developing 
countries continues to widen with respect to per 
capita GNP. 
Growth of  per capita GNP, industrialized 
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VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF INFANT MORTALITY, POST-NEONATAL AND 
FROM ONE TO FOUR YEARS. 1973-1978-1983-1986* 
Infant  and post-neonatal One to four years 
Source:  Castalia, V. and A. Garcia (1968, Infancia  y pobreta en Venezuela:  los efectos  de  la recesión, United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF). 
*Shows only the 1986 figure  for  infant  mortality. 
**Only information  up to 1983 was available for  this figure. 
56 
Figure 6 
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Source: Castalia, V. and A. Garcia (1988), Infancia  y pobreza en Venezurtbflmtfêdos  de  la recesión, Caracas, United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 
